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Abstract 
 
State Consumer Protection Acts (CPAs) were designed to supplement 
the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) mission of protecting consumers 
and are often referred to as “Little-FTC Acts.” There is growing concern 
that enforcement under these acts is not only qualitatively different than 
FTC enforcement but may also be counterproductive for consumers. This 
Article examines a sample of CPA claims and compares them to the FTC 
standard. It identifies qualitative differences between CPA and FTC claims 
by commissioning a “Shadow Federal Trade Commission” of experts in 
consumer protection. The study finds that many CPA claims include 
conduct that would not be illegal under the FTC standards and most of the 
cases with illegal conduct would not warrant FTC enforcement. Even 
among CPA cases in which the plaintiff prevailed, nearly half do not 
include illegal conduct under the FTC standard and most of the cases with 
illegal conduct would not invoke FTC enforcement. The results clearly 
suggest private litigation under Little-FTC Acts tends to pursue a different 
consumer protection mission than the Bureau of Consumer Protection at 
the Federal Trade Commission. 
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INTRODUCTION 
During the 1960s, there was a perceived increase in demand from the 
American public and elected officials for consumer protection legislation.1 
In post-World War II America, a perception emerged that markets had 
become impersonal2 and that the balance of power between consumers and 
merchants in the marketplace had shifted in favor of merchants.3 
Regulators viewed increased legal protection for consumers as necessary to 
restore the former balance.4 Traditional common law protection was 
deemed inadequate.5 State attorneys general attempted to respond to the 
                                                                                                                     
 1. For example, President John F. Kennedy promoted the consumer protection movement by 
defining the consumers’ “bill of rights” in a message to Congress in 1962. JOHN F. KENNEDY, 
CONSUMERS’ PROTECTION AND INTEREST PROGRAM, H.R. DOC. NO. 87–364, at 2 (2d Sess. 1962).  
 2. William A. Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46 TUL. L. REV. 724, 725 
(1972); James R. Withrow, Jr., The Inadequacies of Consumer Protection by Administrative Action, 
1967 N.Y. ST. B.A. ANTITRUST L. SYMP. 58, 64 (“The difficulties being faced by the consumer today 
are best understood in terms of the new ‘impersonality’ of the market place.”); see also NAT’L 
ASS’N OF ATT’Y GEN. COMM. ON THE OFFICE OF ATT’Y GEN., REPORT ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY 
GENERAL 395–96 (1971) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT]. 
 3. H. Peter Norstrand, Treble Damage Actions for Victims of Unfair and Deceptive Trade 
Practices: A New Approach, 4 NEW ENG. L. REV. 171, 175 (1969) (“[The] consumer has lost the 
leverage he once had in the marketplace. The disgruntled buyer can no longer hash out differences 
with his shopkeeper-neighbor; he is now confronted by impersonal bigness where responsibility and 
liability forever lie just one department away.”). 
 4. Brian J. Linn & Gretchen Newman, Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees and Treble Damages—
Balancing the Scales of Consumer Justice, 10 GONZ. L. REV. 593, 597 (1975) (“[T]he goal is to 
reestablish equilibrium in the market place by recognizing that traditional remedies for fraud have 
proven ineffective in providing the aggrieved consumer adequate relief.”). 
 5. Common law causes of action—including deceit, misrepresentation, and breach of 
warranty—had relatively difficult burdens of proof and limited remedies. See Victor E. Schwartz & 
Cary Silverman, Common-Sense Construction of Consumer Protection Acts, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 
6–7 (2005). As a consequence, they were thought to be insufficient to protect the consumer. Id. at 7. 
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apparent need for greater consumer protection by using existing statutory 
laws, such as lottery laws and printer’s ink laws, to protect consumer 
interests. They also advocated broader statutory powers to combat 
consumer fraud and other deceptive practices.6 The state legislatures’ 
responses came in the form of a diverse collection of legislation commonly 
called Consumer Protection Acts (CPAs).7  
Most CPAs were originally designed to supplement the Federal Trade 
Commission’s (FTC) mission of protecting consumers from “unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices”8 and are referred to as “Little-FTC Acts.”9 The 
FTC Act does not itself provide for private actions, but a primary means of 
achieving the CPAs’ consumer protection goal is the private action that 
empowered consumer attorneys to act as private attorneys general.10 In 
contrast to the FTC, private litigants under CPAs are not limited by 
political pressure or public duty.11 Private litigants under CPAs also face 
different financial constraints as many CPAs mandate the award of 
multiple damages and attorneys’ fees to successful plaintiffs.12 As such, 
there may be support for the theory that CPAs do, in fact, fill a gap in 
existing consumer protection institutions by allowing private litigants to 
bring smaller scale cases where the consumer harm is felt locally or 
otherwise escapes the attention of the FTC. These cases may approximate 
FTC enforcement actions in terms of the nature and quality of the claims 
involved. However, the relatively smaller stakes involved in cases brought 
by private litigants may not attract FTC resources or satisfy the FTC 
requirement that consumer protection actions be in the public interest.13 
                                                                                                                     
For example, to succeed in a tort action for false misrepresentation or deceit, the plaintiff must 
prove that there was intent to deceive, which is particularly difficult to do. Id. at 6. Actions in 
contract for breach of contract or breach of warranty are seldom more effective than actions in tort 
as merchants can make false claims without entering into contracts. Id. at 7. 
 6. ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 395–96 (noting acts of attorneys general 
including using existing laws and proposing new statutory powers). 
 7. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 5, at 15. 
 8. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006). 
 9. See Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under the Deceptive Trade Practices Acts: 
Reconsidering the FTC Act as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 437, 438–39 (1991); see also Mark D. 
Bauer, The Licensed Professional Exemption in Consumer Protection: At Odds with Antitrust 
History and Precedent, 73 TENN. L. REV. 131, 144 (2006). 
 10. Bauer, supra note 9, at 144. 
 11. The FTC and private litigants face different incentives and constraints that affect the 
nature of actions pursued. Sovern, supra note 9, at 437. For example, the FTC may decline to 
pursue an enforcement action that would be pursued by an individual consumer, or class of 
consumers, under a CPA. The FTC faces three primary limitations in selecting enforcement actions 
that do not constrain the private plaintiff. First, as political appointees, some FTC Commissioners 
are bound to be subject to political pressure to pursue or not pursue certain types of actions. Id. at 
441. Second, the FTC has limited resources which must be rationed to enforcement actions against 
only the most serious improprieties. Id. at 442. Third, the FTC Act itself restricts the FTC to bring 
proceedings only when it would be in the public interest. Id. 
 12. Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 5, at 3. 
 13. Marshall A. Leaffer & Michael H. Lipson, Consumer Actions Against Unfair or 
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The consumer, on the other hand, is free to pursue any case in which she 
might expect to prevail.  
State CPAs have become controversial.14 There is growing concern that 
CPA enforcement and litigation are not only qualitatively different than 
FTC enforcement but also may be counterproductive for consumers. 
Critics argue that the combination of private rights of action, generous 
remedies, expansive and elusive definitions of illegal conduct, lack of 
administrative expertise, and relaxation of common law limitations have 
generated a set of incentives that encourages plaintiffs and their attorneys 
to file claims of dubious merit.15 Critics suggest that CPAs’ broader 
enforcement options place significant strains on the civil justice system 
without providing offsetting gains in consumer protection.16 Proponents of 
CPAs counter that private rights of action and meaningful remedies are 
necessary to supplement FTC enforcement and provide sufficient 
incentives for individual plaintiffs to bring suit to deter conduct harmful to 
a larger class of consumers.17 While both critics and proponents of CPA 
enforcement make claims about the nature and quality of state consumer 
protection litigation, it is difficult to compare state CPA litigation to FTC 
enforcement. 
This Article closely examines a sample of CPA claims and compares 
them to the FTC Act standard for unfair and deceptive acts or practices. It 
identifies qualitative differences between CPA and FTC claims by 
commissioning a “Shadow Federal Trade Commission” of consumer 
protection experts. These experts evaluated a sample of CPA claims under 
the FTC standard. These two studies generate data that are critical to 
informing policy debates on the appropriate role of CPAs in the civil 
justice system. 
Part I of this Article provides the background and history of CPAs. Part 
II describes the data and research methodology for the “Shadow FTC” 
study. Part III presents the Shadow FTC results. The basic result is that the 
Little-FTC Acts appear to have taken on a much broader consumer 
                                                                                                                     
Deceptive Acts or Practices: The Private Use of Federal Trade Commission Jurisprudence, 48 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 554 (1980).  
 14. Compare Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 5, at 5 (recounting history of CPAs, 
including California’s where voters restricted their statute because of its perceived use to 
“‘shakedown’” small businesses), and Michael S. Greve, Consumer Law, Class Actions, and the 
Common Law, 7 CHAP. L. REV. 155, 156 (2004) (arguing that it does not make sense to have CPAs 
and common law doctrines “operate on top of each other and over the same range of transactions”), 
with Jean Braucher, Deception, Economic Loss and Mass-Market Customers: Consumer Protection 
Statues as Persuasive Authority in the Common Law of Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 829, 830–33 
(2006) (describing state CPAs as popular). 
 15. See Henry N. Butler & Jason S. Johnston, Reforming State Consumer Protection 
Liability: An Economic Approach, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 7–9 (2010); see also Schwartz & 
Silverman, supra note 5, at 33. 
 16. See, e.g., Butler & Johnston, supra note 15, at 7–11; Greve, supra note 14, at 174–78; 
Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 5, at 49–50.  
 17. See, e.g., Braucher, supra note 14, at 832–33. 
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protection function than the FTC. Part IV considers the policy implications 
of these results. 
I.  BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF CONSUMER PROTECTION ACTS 
A.  Criticism of Former Methods of Consumer Protection and 
the Call for CPAs 
The push for states to adopt CPAs appears to have come from the 
confluence of three related forces in the late 1960s: criticism of FTC 
consumer protection efforts, popular demand for consumer protection and 
business regulation, and frustration with common law causes of action. 
These three forces touch on each of the existing institutions of consumer 
protection: federal regulation, market forces, and state common law.18 It 
was the perceived inadequacies of each of these institutions that led states 
to enact CPAs. 
The FTC was the target of criticism of federal consumer protection. By 
1969, denouncement of the FTC had reached its zenith with publication of 
critical reports from “Nader’s Raiders,”19 the American Bar Association,20 
and Professor Richard Posner.21 This criticism addressed a range of 
perceived problems with the FTC,22 including those offered by prior 
critics:23 poor leadership,24 insufficient and misallocated resources,25 
                                                                                                                     
 18. See Timothy J. Muris, The Federal Trade Commission and the Future Development of 
U.S. Consumer Protection Policy (Geo. Mason Univ. Sch. of Law, Law and Econ. Working Paper 
Series No. 04-19, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=545182 (describing the 
institutions of consumer protection yet neglecting the role of state consumer protection laws). 
 19. EDWARD F. COX ET AL., ‘THE NADER REPORT’ ON THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION vii–xiv 
(1969). 
 20. REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1969). 
 21. Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 47 & n.1 
(1969) (listing publications between 1924 and 1969 criticizing the Federal Trade Commission). 
Posner was also a member of the ABA Commission that authored the 1969 report. See REPORT OF 
THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 20. 
 22. Posner, supra note 21, at 47 (“The Commission is rudderless; poorly managed and poorly 
staffed; obsessed with trivia; politicized; all in all, inefficient and incompetent.”); REPORT OF THE 
ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 20, at 1 (“Through lack 
of effective direction, the FTC has failed to establish goals and priorities, to provide necessary 
guidance to its staff, and to manage the flow of its work in an efficient and expeditious 
manner. . . . Through an inadequate system of recruitment and promotion, it has acquired and 
elevated to important positions a number of staff members of insufficient competence. The failure 
of the FTC to establish and adhere to a system of priorities has caused a misallocation of funds and 
personnel to trivial matters rather than to matters of pressing public concern. The primary 
responsibility for these failures must rest with the leadership of the Commission.”); COX ET AL., 
supra note 19, at 39 (“1. The FTC has failed to detect violations systematically. 2. The FTC has 
failed to establish efficient priorities for its enforcement energy. 3. The FTC has failed to enforce 
the powers it has with energy and speed. 4. The FTC has failed to seek sufficient statutory authority 
to make its work effective.”). 
 23. Posner, supra note 21, at 47 (“What is remarkable about these studies, which span a 
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political favoritism and regulatory capture,26 and protection of producers in 
the name of consumer protection.27  
Proponents of stronger regulation argued that federal regulation and 
market forces no longer adequately protected consumers. The increasingly 
impersonal nature of transactions in the post-World War II economy had 
undercut consumers’ power to protect themselves through market-based 
and reputation-based mechanisms.28 Consumer protection advocates also 
pointed to the increasing complexity of credit arrangements, marketing 
schemes,29 and warranty disclaimers as evidence of the breakdown of the 
traditional “arm’s-length bargain” approach to consumer transactions.30 
The general perception was that the balance of power between consumers 
and merchants in the marketplace had shifted towards merchants, who now 
enjoyed disproportionate influence in consumer transactions. It appears 
that there was widespread support for greater legal protection for 
consumers in order to restore the former balance.31  
The final factor leading to the push for states to enact CPAs was the 
view that common law causes of action were insufficient to protect the 
consumer—particularly because they imposed impractically high 
evidentiary burdens in exchange for meager remedies.32 The common law 
actions for fraudulent misrepresentation and deceit serve as examples of 
the common law’s impracticality in consumer protection cases. These 
causes of action required actual injury to mature; this requirement 
                                                                                                                     
period of 45 years, is the sameness of their conclusions.”). 
 24. Id. at 87 (“[T]he Commission today is probably more poorly managed than other federal 
agencies.”); REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra 
note 20, at 35–36; COX ET AL., supra note 19, at 169–71. 
 25. REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 
20, at 26–28. 
 26. COX ET AL., supra note 19, at 130–40.  
 27. Posner, supra note 21, at 71 (“A perusal of FTC rules and decisions reveals hundreds of 
cases in which prohibitory orders have been entered against practices, not involving serious 
deception, by which sellers have attempted to market a new, often cheaper, substitute for an existing 
product.”). 
 28. ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 395–96; Lovett, supra note 2, at 725; 
Withrow, supra note 2, at 64 (“The difficulties being faced by the consumer today are best 
understood in terms of the new ‘impersonality’ of the market place.”).  
 29. ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 395. 
 30. Lovett, supra note 2, at 725. 
 31. Linn & Newman, supra note 4, at 597 (“[T]he goal is to reestablish equilibrium in the 
market place by recognizing that traditional remedies for fraud have proven ineffective in providing 
the aggrieved consumer adequate relief.”); Norstrand, supra note 3, at 175 (“[The] consumer has 
lost the leverage he once had in the marketplace. The disgruntled buyer can no longer hash out 
differences with his shopkeeper-neighbor; he is now confronted by impersonal bigness where 
responsibility and liability forever lie just one department away.”). 
 32. Robert H. Quinn, Consumer Protection Comes of Age in Massachusetts, 4 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 71, 72 (1969) (“It was, after all, primarily the failure of the legal system to provide adequate 
remedies which led to the great consumer movement of the past decade with the resultant deluge of 
new laws.”). 
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precluded prospective injunctions against merchants engaging in 
potentially deceptive acts. An additional barrier to consumer protection 
suits was the requirement that an injured party had the difficult burden of 
proving that there was intent to deceive.33 Actions for breach of contract or 
warranty were seldom more effective than actions in tort because 
merchants could make false claims without entering into contracts.34 Even 
where a contract existed, contractual defenses such as reliance and privity 
requirements could impede consumer recovery.35 Further, even if the 
consumer had a valid claim and could meet the burden of proof, she might 
still have chosen to forego pursuit of the claim if it involved a pecuniary 
loss that was small relative to the cost of bringing suit.  
In the face of FTC criticism, popular demand for increased regulation of 
business and frustration with the limits of common law causes of action, 
many states adopted consumer protection legislation in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. By 1981, every state had adopted some consumer protection 
legislation. Most states have frequently amended their consumer protection 
legislation, resulting in great variation between states—even where the 
same model act was initially adopted.36 
B.  Consumer Fraud Acts and Early Model Acts 
By 1962, eight states had responded to the call for consumer protection 
and passed some act aimed at protecting consumers.37 These early CPAs 
generally armed state attorneys general with the power to seek and receive 
injunctions against specific practices. One early adopter, New Jersey, 
passed a “consumer fraud” statute in 1960 that became the model for 
several states’ initial CPAs.38 The act gave the Attorney General broad 
powers to investigate alleged unlawful practices, to obtain an injunction 
against persons engaging or about to engage in the unlawful practices, and 
to seek restitution for those harmed by the prohibited practices.39 While 
several states passed similar acts, others, such as Washington, enacted 
legislation modeled on the FTC Act and the Clayton Act.40 
                                                                                                                     
 33. Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 5, at 7 (noting barriers to common law actions, 
including the preclusion of prospective remedies and problems in proving an intent to deceive).  
 34. Id. 
 35. Sovern, supra note 9, at 451–52. 
 36. 1 DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW § 2:10, 
app. at 3A (2009). 
 37. Id. app. at 3A. 
 38. ch. 39, § 1–12 1960 N.J. Laws 137 (codified as amended at N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 56:8-1 to 
56:8-148 (2010)).  
 39. Id. § 8. 
 40. Consumer Protection-Unfair Competition and Acts, 1961, ch. 216, § 2, Wash. Sess. 1956 
(codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.86.010–19.86.920 (2010)). Section 2 of the 
Washington legislation paralleled the FTC Act and read: “Unfair methods of competition and unfair 
or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared 
unlawful.” Id. 
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Several uniform and model statutes appeared in the late 1960s.41 Many 
modern CPA attributes can be traced back to these early model and 
uniform statutes. The first of the uniform consumer protection statutes to 
appear was the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA), which 
was drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws in 1964 and rewritten in 1966.42 The UDTPA lists twelve 
deceptive trade practices, the first eleven of which can be roughly divided 
into three categories of prohibited conduct: misleading trade identification, 
false advertising, and deceptive advertising.43 The final listed practice was 
a general prohibition of “any other conduct which similarly creates a 
likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding.”44 The twelve deceptive trade 
practices prohibited by the UDTPA, including the final, more general 
prohibition of other unfair conduct, were primarily intended to prevent 
unfair business competition, not to protect consumers.45  
The UDTPA granted a private right of action but limited the remedy to 
injunctive relief. The UDTPA did not contain the restrictions of common 
law causes of action—neither proof of damages nor intent to deceive were 
required to obtain an injunction.46 As amended in 1966, the UDTPA 
authorized reasonable attorneys’ fees to be granted to the plaintiff if the 
defendant willfully and knowingly engaged in the deceptive practice and to 
the defendant if the plaintiff knew his complaint was groundless.47 Most of 
the states that initially adopted the UDTPA in some form later amended 
their consumer protection law to allow monetary relief to consumers.48  
The Model Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law 
(UTPCPL) is the model statute most commonly associated with modern 
CPA laws.49 Developed by the FTC and adopted by the Committee on 
Suggested State Legislation of the Council of State Governments, the 
UTPCPL was originally published in 1967, only to be amended in 1969 
and again in 1970.50 The UTPCPL was less innovative than 
comprehensive. It brought together many elements of prior pieces of 
consumer protection legislation and, in doing so, created an attractive 
private cause of action. 
                                                                                                                     
 41. See ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 400. 
 42. Id.; Bauer, supra note 9, at 145.  
 43. COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF 
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING 
IN ITS SEVENTY-THIRD YEAR 253, 258–62 (1964). 
 44. Id. at 262. 
 45. See 1 PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 36, § 2:10; see also Bauer, supra note 9, at 145. 
 46. COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, supra note 43, at 262. 
 47. COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF 
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING 
IN ITS SEVENTY-FIFTH YEAR 299 (1966). 
 48. See 1 PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 36, § 2:10. 
 49. Id. 
 50. ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 399. 
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The 1970 version of the UTPCPL offered a choice of three forms of 
unlawful practices.51 The first alternative form of unlawful practices used 
essentially the same language as § 5 of the FTC Act: “Unfair methods of 
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any 
trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful.”52 This language has led 
many commentators to refer to CPAs in this vein as “Little-FTC Acts.”53 
Twenty states initially adopted such acts.54  
The second alternative form of unlawful practices prohibited by the 
UTPCPL resembled the language of the consumer fraud acts adopted in the 
early and mid-1960s by states such as New Jersey.55 This alternative 
defined as unlawful “‘false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in 
the conduct of any trade or commerce.’”56 This definition does not prohibit 
the broad category of “unfair practices.”57 Although a number of states had 
adopted similar consumer fraud acts earlier in the 1960s, no state adopted 
this language based upon the UTPCPL.58  
The third alternative offered by the UTPCPL, known as the “‘laundry 
list’ approach,” included the twelve competition-focused prohibitions 
enumerated in the UDTPA.59 It added an additional thirteenth provision 
focused more directly on consumers.60 This thirteenth provision prohibited 
                                                                                                                     
 51. 29 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, 1970 SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 142 (1969).  
 52. Id. at 142, 146. The first version of the UTPCPL in 1967 used this language to define the 
prohibited acts. 26 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, 1967 SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION, at A-73 
(1966). 
 53. 1 PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 36, § 2:10. 
 54. Id.  
 55. See 29 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 51, at 142. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See 1 PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 36, § 2:10. 
 58. Id.; see also 29 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 51, at 142. 
 59. See 29 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 51, at 142; see also 1 PRIDGEN & 
ALDERMAN, supra note 36, § 2:10.  
 60. See 29 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 51, at 142, 146–47 (“The following unfair 
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or 
commerce are hereby declared to be unlawful: (1) passing off goods or services as those of another; 
(2) causing likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship, approval, 
or certification of goods or services; (3) causing likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as 
to affiliation, connection, or association with, or certification by, another; (4) using deceptive 
representations or designations of geographic origin in connection with goods or services; (5) 
representing that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, 
benefits, or quantities that they do not have or that a person has a sponsorship, approval, status, 
affiliation, or connection that he does not have; (6) representing that goods are original or new if 
they are deteriorated, altered, reconditioned, reclaimed, used, or secondhand; (7) representing that 
goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, or grade, or that goods are of a particular 
style or model, if they are of another; (8) disparaging the goods, services, or business of another by 
false or misleading representation of fact; (9) advertising goods or services with intent not to sell 
than as advertised; (10) advertising goods or services with intent not to supply reasonably 
expectable public demand, unless the advertisement discloses a limitation of quantity; (11) making 
false or misleading statements of fact concerning the reasons for, existence of, or amounts of price 
reductions; (12) engaging in any other conduct which similarly creates a likelihood of confusion or 
of misunderstanding; or (13) engaging in any act or practice which is unfair or deceptive to the 
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any act or practice that was “unfair or deceptive to the consumer.”61 
Twenty-six jurisdictions adopted this language.62 Today, most of the states 
that had originally adopted the third form no longer rely exclusively on the 
laundry list approach; however, five jurisdictions still prohibit only specific 
acts without a “catch-all” provision prohibiting unfair and deceptive 
practices.63  
The UTPCPL gave state attorneys general powers similar to those in 
earlier consumer fraud acts.64 Section 5 authorized the Attorney General to 
act to enforce the prohibition of acts and practices defined in § 2:  
Whenever the attorney general has reason to believe that 
any person is using, has used, or is about to use any method, 
act or practice declared by Section 2 of this Act to be 
unlawful, and that proceedings would be in the public interest, 
he may bring an action in the name of the State against such 
person to restrain by temporary or permanent injunction the 
use of such method, act or practice. . . .65  
The attorney general was also entitled to seek relief by restitution or 
disgorgement of money or property acquired as a result of any act declared 
unlawful by the UTPCPL66 and civil penalties for a knowing violation of 
the UTPCPL.67  
In addition to attorney general enforcement, the UTPCPL authorized 
private actions for monetary damages. Section 8 of the UTPCPL 
authorized private suits and class actions for monetary damages as well as 
injunctive relief.68 Private individuals could recover the greater of “actual 
damages or $200,” with punitive damages and equitable relief available at 
                                                                                                                     
consumer.”). 
 61. Id. at 142. 
 62. 1 PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 36, § 2:10 & n.6 (“Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, 
California, Georgia, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Nebraska, 
Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, 
Utah, Virginia, Virgin Islands, and West Virginia.”).  
 63. Id. § 2:10 & n.7 (listing Colorado, District of Columbia, Indiana, Mississippi, and New 
York as maintaining pure laundry lists approaches). The twenty-one other jurisdictions that use a 
laundry list approach also have some general prohibition of unfair and deceptive acts. Id. § 2:10. 
 64. See 29 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 51, at 145, 150–52. Sections 11 through 14 
granted the Attorney General broad investigatory powers, the power to issue subpoenas, and the 
power to enforce the investigatory demands. Id. at 150–52. 
 65. Id. at 147–48.  
 66. Id. at 148. 
 67. Id. at 152. 
 68. Id. at 148–49. Section 8(a) read in part: “Any person who purchases or leases goods or 
services primarily for personal, family or household purposes and thereby suffers any ascertainable 
loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by another person 
of a method, act or practice declared unlawful by Section 2 of this Act, may bring an action . . . .” 
Id. 
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the court’s discretion.69 Section 8(b) authorized “persons similarly 
situated” to bring a class action. Section 8(d) stated that the court “may 
award, in addition to the relief provided in this Section, reasonable 
attorneys’ fees and costs.”70  
The UTPCPL consciously attempted not to stray too far from relevant 
FTC enforcement standards. Section 3 stated that “due consideration and 
great weight shall be given to the interpretations of the Federal Trade 
Commission and the federal courts relating to Section 5(a)(1) of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act . . . .”71 Further, it empowered the Attorney 
General to “make rules and regulations interpreting” the prohibited actions 
but that “[s]uch rules and regulations shall not be inconsistent with the 
rules, regulations and decisions of the Federal Trade Commission and the 
federal courts in interpreting the provisions of Section 5(a)(1) of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act . . . .”72 Twenty-eight states currently 
reference the FTC in their CPAs.73 
C.  Comparing Federal and State Consumer Protection 
Having been enacted in the face of criticism of the FTC, it is not 
surprising that state and federal consumer protection legislation have 
noticeable differences. The key differences are that states provide a private 
right of action, different remedies, and relaxed common law limitations on 
consumer protection actions when compared to FTC policy standards.74  
The FTC Act does not include a private enforcement mechanism, yet 
every CPA grants consumers a private right of action.75 This difference is 
driven by the “balance of power” argument that in interactions between 
businesses and consumers, more power must be shifted towards 
consumers. This argument suggests that a private remedy for wronged 
consumers is necessary for the effective prosecution of consumer 
complaints.76 These private rights of action were envisioned as a 
complement to public agency administrative enforcement under the FTC 
Act. Although public enforcement under the FTC Act requires the 
                                                                                                                     
 69. Id. at 149. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 147. 
 72. Id. 
 73. 1 PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 36, app. at 3B. Most states’ statutes provide that the 
courts should be guided by FTC interpretations except that such interpretations are not dispositive. 
See generally CAROLYN L. CARTER & JONATHAN SHELDON, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., UNFAIR 
AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES (7th ed. 2008) (surveying state statutes). 
 74. Compare 1 PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 36, § 2:9, app. at 5A–6A, with 15 U.S.C. 
§ 45 (2006). 
 75. See 1 PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 36, app. at 5A. Iowa was the last state without a 
private right of action but recently enacted one with the Private Right of Action for Consumer Fraud 
Act. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 714H.5 (West 2010). 
 76. See ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 408; see also Norstrand, supra note 3, 
at 174–75. 
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Commission to consider the public interest in deciding whether to 
challenge a practice, only a few states include a public interest requirement 
for private actions.77 
A second difference between CPAs and FTC consumer protection is 
that the statutes confer different remedies.78 Remedies available under the 
FTC Act include injunctions, cease and desist orders, consent decrees, and 
the disgorgement of profits.79 While at least a dozen CPAs limit plaintiffs 
to actual damages, restitution, or equitable relief,80 the majority of statutes 
provide additional remedies, including statutory damages, treble damages, 
and punitive damages.81 Nearly all states authorize the discretionary award 
of attorneys’ fees.82  
A third dimension upon which CPAs differ from the FTC Act, and also 
from one another, is the degree to which state legislation and judicial 
interpretation have relaxed the common law limitations on consumer 
                                                                                                                     
 77. See, e.g., Hall v. Walter, 969 P.2d 224, 234 (Colo. 1998) (stating that the practice 
challenged by an individual under the state’s statute must significantly impact the public as actual 
or potential consumers); Zeeman v. Black, 273 S.E.2d 910, 915 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) (stating that 
unless the defendant’s actions had or has potential harm for the consumer public they are not 
directly regulated by Georgia’s respective statute); Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 314 (Minn. 
2000) (stating that public interest must be demonstrated to state a claim under the private attorney 
general statute); Nelson v. Lusterstone Surfacing Co., 605 N.W.2d 136, 139 (Neb. 2000) (holding 
that to be actionable under the CPA the unfair or deceptive act must have impact on the public 
interest); Jefferies v. Phillips, 451 S.E.2d 21, 23 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that to be actionable 
under that state’s CPA, unfair or deceptive practices must adversely affect the public interest); 
Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 719 P.2d 531, 533 (Wash. 1986) (en 
banc) (stating that private litigant must establish a public interest impact to establish a prima facie 
case under the CPA).  
 78. See Butler & Johnston, supra note 15, at 16–17. 
79. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). 
 80. Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 5, at 22. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-113 
(LexisNexis 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.211(2) (West 2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-0.5-4(b) 
(West 2010); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1213 (West 2010); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-
408 (West 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325D.45 (West 2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-15(1) 
(LexisNexis 2010); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 59-1609 (West 2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-24-31 
(West 2010); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (West 2010); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 100.18(11)(b)(2) (West 2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-108(b) (West 2010). 
 81. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 5, at 23–24. In some cases, damages are doubled 
or trebled regardless of the egregiousness of the defendant’s conduct. E.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. 
§ 45.50.531(a) (West 2010); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3905(k) (2010); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 480-
13(a) (West 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19 (West 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (West 2010); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.20(5) (West 2010). Nine states provide for treble damages if the defendant 
acted intentionally, willfully, knowingly, or in bad faith. COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-113(2)(a)(III) 
(West 2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-399(c) (West 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 93A, § 9(3) 
(West 2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:10 (West 2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-10(B) 
(West 2010); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349(h) (McKinney 2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140(a) 
(West 2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-109(a)(3) (West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-204(A) 
(West 2010); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (West 2010). 
 82. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 5, at 25–27. 
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protection claims. The common law requirement of reliance is a useful 
example. The majority of statutes do not require a CPA plaintiff to show 
that he or she relied on the defendant’s allegedly deceptive act or 
statement,83 while the FTC requires reasonable reliance in its definitions of 
both unfair and deceptive practices.84 Other state courts have held that a 
misrepresentation, absent evidence of other harm to the consumer or that 
the plaintiff relied on the misrepresentation, is sufficient to demonstrate 
consumer injury.85 Some state courts have held that defenses such as the 
statute of frauds,86 warranty disclaimers,87 the doctrine of substantial 
performance,88 the parol evidence rule,89 the common law merger 
doctrine,90 contractual limitations on liability or remedies,91 and privity of 
contract requirements92 are not available to defendants in consumer 
protection cases.  
                                                                                                                     
 83. Id. at 18–19. 
 84. Letter from James C. Miller III, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to John D. Dingell, 
Chairman, Comm. on Energy & Commerce (Oct. 14, 1983), available at www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-
decpet.htm; Letter from Michael Pertschuk, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, and Paul Rand Dixon, 
David A. Clanton, Robert Pitofsky, and Patricia P. Bailey, Comm’rs, Fed. Trade Comm., to 
Wendell H. Ford, Chairman, Consumer Subcomm. of Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., and 
John C. Danforth, Ranking Minority Member, Consumer Subcomm. of Comm. on Commerce, Sci., 
& Transp. (Dec. 17, 1980), available at www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-unfair.htm. 
 85. See, e.g., Aspinall v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 813 N.E.2d 476, 486 (Mass. 2005). 
 86. See, e.g., McClure v. Duggan, 674 F. Supp. 211, 224 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (holding the 
statute of frauds was not applicable under Texas deceptive trade practices act). 
 87. See, e.g., Attaway v. Tom’s Auto Sales, Inc., 242 S.E.2d 740, 742–43 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1978). 
 88. See, e.g., Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. 1980). The court stated that “[a] 
primary purpose of the enactment of the DTPA was to provide consumers a cause of action for 
deceptive trade practices without the burden of proof and numerous defenses encountered in a 
common law fraud or breach of warranty suit.” Id. at 616. 
 89. See, e.g., Capp Homes v. Duarte, 617 F.2d 900, 902 n.1 (1st Cir. 1980) (holding that 
parol evidence may be used in Massachusetts consumer protection cases); Teague Motor Co. v. 
Rowton, 733 P.2d 93, 96 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that parol evidence may be used in Oregon 
consumer protection cases); Weitzel v. Barnes, 691 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. 1985) (holding that 
parol evidence may be used in Texas consumer protection cases). 
 90. See, e.g., Alvarado v. Bolton, 749 S.W.2d 47, 48 (Tex. 1988) (holding that the common 
law doctrine of merger is no defense to a claim for breach of express warranty under Texas’s 
DTPA); see also Karen S. Guerra, DTPA Precludes Use of Merger Doctrine and Parol Evidence 
Rule in Breach of Warranty Suit: Alvarado v. Bolton, 41 BAYLOR L. REV. 373, 376–80 (1989).  
 91. See, e.g., Int’l Nickel Co. v. Trammel Crow Distrib. Corp., 803 F.2d 150, 155–56 (5th 
Cir. 1986) (holding contractual limitations inapplicable in suit under Texas “Little-FTC Act”); 
Corral v. Rollins Protective Servs. Co., 732 P.2d 1260, 1271 (Kan. 1987) (holding similarly under 
Kansas law); Reliance Universal, Inc. v. Sparks Indus. Servs., Inc., 688 S.W.2d 890, 893 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1985) (holding similarly under Texas law). 
 92. See, e.g., Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 540–41 (Tex. 1981) 
(holding that privity between the plaintiff and defendant is not required under Texas’s DTPA); see 
also Lotte D. Bostick, Comment, The DTPA and Privity: Let the Buyer Beware Becomes Let the 
Buyer Recover, 39 BAYLOR L. REV. 787, 795–96 (1987). 
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The CPAs’ attractive private right of action, unlike the FTC standard, is 
often divorced from a public interest requirement and from common-law 
limitations. These differences have caused some to suggest that CPAs may 
be subject to abuse by litigants who have suffered no actual harm and that 
this abuse will ultimately harm, rather than protect, consumers.93 
D.  Expanding and Amending CPAs  
Amendments and judicial interpretation of CPAs have tended to expand 
rather than contract the rights of consumers.94 Massachusetts’ experience is 
representative of the early expansion of CPAs. Massachusetts’ original 
CPA gave the Commonwealth’s Attorney General the authority to 
investigate and subpoena95 and, in the interest of the public, bring an action 
seeking injunctive relief and civil penalties up to $10,000.96 The law 
originally did not provide for any type of private action, and aggrieved 
consumers could seek recourse only through common law alternatives in 
tort or contract.97 In 1969, the CPA was amended to give a private right of 
action by adopting language similar to § 8 of the UTPCPL.98 The 
amendment allowed consumers to receive the greater of treble damages or 
$25 upon proof of injury by an unfair or deceptive practice.99 
Amendments to CPAs have often sought to provide adequate incentives 
for consumers to act as private enforcers. Proponents of CPAs argued that 
if consumers were not willing to litigate and pursue complaints, CPAs 
could not fulfill their intended purpose of deterring deceptive and unfair 
trade practices. Suits involving common law actions were often 
uneconomical for the aggrieved consumer because of high burdens of proof 
and the difficulty of establishing damages. CPAs circumvent those issues 
by providing causes of action that require less rigorous burdens of proof 
than their common law counterparts. For example, the UDTPA stated that 
“[p]roof of monetary damage, loss of profits, or intent to deceive is not 
required [to receive relief].”100 CPA expansion has also often involved a 
reduction in the consumers’ burden of proof.101  
These reductions in the burden of proof have been controversial. Some 
commentators argued that the presence of a credible threat in the form of a 
                                                                                                                     
 93. See Butler & Johnston, supra note 15, at 69. 
 94. However, this is not true for all state statutes. For example, the Illinois Supreme Court has 
contracted the geographic scope of its CPA. See Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 835 
N.E.2d 801, 853 (Ill. 2005) (limiting class actions brought under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act to 
fraudulent transactions that occur within Illinois borders).  
 95. MASS GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 93A, § 6 (1969). 
 96. Id. § 4. 
 97. Norstrand, supra note 3, at 173. 
 98. See ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 408; see also supra note 68. 
 99. ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 408. 
 100. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT § 3(a) (1966).  
 101. David A. Rice, Exemplary Damages in Private Consumer Actions, 55 IOWA L. REV. 307, 
326–28 (1969). 
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private right of action with treble damages would be enough to restore the 
equilibrium between consumers and merchants, and reductions in the 
burden of proof are therefore not necessary.102 Others recognize that CPAs 
give rise to the potential for harassment of legitimate business conduct103 
and that vague consumer fraud statutes invite the possibility of abuse.104 
Amendments to CPAs have also tended to include provisions allowing 
class actions. States were slower to adopt class action provisions than 
private rights of action in large part because of concerns of abuse. In 1971, 
the National Association of Attorneys General recommended that states 
empower attorneys general to bring class action suits105 but warned that 
allowing private class action suits would “provide[] too great an 
opportunity for frivolous suits.”106 Balancing these concerns, some states 
adopted the provision of private class action suits along with provisions 
intended to make it harder to bring a frivolous class action suit. For 
example, Massachusetts attempted to avoid frivolous class actions by 
requiring a thirty-day opportunity for the respondent to the potential class 
action to make restitution.107 Alaska’s class action provision required a 
bond and approval by the attorney general before a class action suit could 
be certified.108 The Uniform Consumer Sales Practice Act provided fee-
shifting in favor of defendants if a class action suit was found to be 
groundless.109 
E.  Modern Concerns Emerge 
By the early 1990s, the increasing use of CPAs generated criticism that 
CPAs were being used in ways that the legislatures never intended, leading 
to substantial abuse and frivolous lawsuits.110 Commentators and experts 
began to question whether CPAs were fulfilling their original promise to 
supplement public enforcement and enhance consumer outcomes and 
whether the courts were interpreting the statutes correctly, especially in the 
private litigation context.111 Others argued that the low threshold for unfair 
and deceptive acts had gone too far in aiding plaintiffs, encouraging claims 
                                                                                                                     
 102. Norstrand, supra note 3, at 175 (“Even if rarely invoked, awareness by the consumer that 
he need not be helpless when victimized by fraud can only improve the commercial climate. If this 
means ‘caveat vendor’, then so be it.”). 
 103. Lovett, supra note 2, at 744–45. 
 104. E.g., Rice, supra note 101, at 340. 
 105. ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 409. 
 106. Id. 
 107.  Id. 
 108. Id. at 409–10.  
 109. Id. at 409. 
 110. Wayne E. Green, Lawyers Give Deceptive-Trade Statutes New Day in Court, Wider 
Interpretations, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 1990, at B1. 
 111. Perry A. Craft, State Consumer Protection Enforcement: Recent Trends and 
Developments, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 997, 997, 1000 (1991) (stating that throughout the 1980s states’ 
attorneys general were active in enforcement of their states CPAs, without substantial criticism). 
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that ultimately were not in the public interest,112 and that the low level of 
proof required in a CPA claim made it too easy for an unharmed consumer 
to succeed and receive substantial damages.113 In addition, some 
commentators have argued that claims were increasingly brought under the 
auspices of consumer protection that would have traditionally been brought 
as environmental, product liability, or contract claims.114 Recent 
commentators have argued that modern CPA liability, characterized by 
supra-compensatory remedies and minimal injury requirements, may have 
harmful consequences for consumers by taxing socially desirable business 
conduct such as communications between merchants and consumers.115 
What follows is the first attempt to bring a large-scale, empirical analysis 
to bear on these modern concerns. 
II.  SHADOW FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 
Many of the key policy questions involving CPAs require some 
comparison of CPA claims to other possible standards for consumer 
protection. This section focuses on whether there are important qualitative 
differences in claims between those brought in courts and enforcement 
actions brought under § 5 of the FTC Act standards by creating an expert 
panel to review and apply the FTC standard to a sample of cases litigated 
under CPAs. CPA claims are compared to the benchmark established by 
the FTC consumer protection standard. Recognizing the differences in 
claims brought under federal and state consumer protection authority is an 
important first step to understanding the consumer protection litigation 
landscape. These possible differences, read in conjunction with the 
evidence that litigation activity is highly correlated with CPA statutes that 
make lawsuits more attractive to plaintiffs, raise the possibility that claims 
brought under CPAs are of a different nature than those enforced by the 
FTC. 
In order to test whether qualitative differences exist between CPA cases 
and those falling under the FTC’s standards for unfair and deceptive 
practices, an expert review panel, the Shadow FTC, consisting of five 
Shadow Commissioners with substantial consumer protection experience 
at or with the FTC, reviewed sets of one page case scenarios of 
representative CPA cases. The Shadow FTC panelists answered questions 
on whether they believed these cases would likely contain illegal conduct 
and, if so, would they likely be enforced under the FTC standard. The 
Shadow FTC’s responses allow identification of important differences 
                                                                                                                     
 112. Sovern, supra note 9, at 437. 
 113. Jon Mize, Comment, Fencing Off the Path of Least Resistance: Re-Examining the Role of 
Little FTC Act Actions in the Law of False Advertising, 72 TENN. L. REV. 653, 653–54 (2005); 
Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 5, at 3. 
 114. Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 5, at 3–4. 
 115. See Butler & Johnston, supra note 15, at 35–36, 44, 47–51. Actual and potential 
defendant merchants may pass the costs of CPA litigation on to consumers through higher prices. 
Id. 
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between the actual outcomes of the CPA cases used in the review and 
likely outcomes under the FTC standard. 
A.  Shadow FTC Selection 
Five individuals with substantial experience at or with the FTC Bureau 
of Consumer Protection were invited to serve as Shadow Commissioners. 
The Shadow Commissioners include four former directors or deputy 
directors of the Bureau of Consumer Protection who are practitioners and 
academics with significant expertise on consumer protection issues. The 
fifth Shadow Commissioner did not serve at the FTC but had substantial 
experience as a practitioner. The Shadow FTC was selected to ensure a 
balance in political orientation with two Shadow Commissioners who 
served in the FTC during Democratic administrations and two who served 
in the FTC during Republican administrations. The fifth Shadow 
Commissioner did not serve at the FTC under an administration of either 
party and, therefore, is considered unaffiliated. 
B.  Sample Selection of Cases 
A key feature of the Shadow FTC study is the inclusion of litigated 
cases that generated substantive decisions under CPAs. The cases were 
obtained from a database of approximately 17,000 CPA decisions.116 Three 
distinct samples of cases were constructed. 
The first sample began with a randomly generated sample of 500 
reported CPA decisions from the original population database. From these 
500 reported CPA decisions, eighty-six contained case facts sufficient to 
develop one-page scenarios, and fifty of these eighty-six were randomly 
chosen.  
The second sample was drawn from reported CPA decisions in state 
appellate courts but not federal district courts because the former were 
more likely to have reached final disposition as a “clear win” and less 
likely to have remaining appeals. To be clear, this sample is intentionally 
biased toward including the strongest CPA claims. For each state, a 
specific search string was created that contained that state’s CPA title, 
abbreviation, or citation as well as variations on the term “damage 
award.”117 These search strings were then applied to each state’s “State 
Cases, Combined” database in Lexis from 2000 through 2007. This search 
resulted in 3,637 reported CPA decisions. We removed CPA claimant 
losses, wins that were subsequently overturned on appeal, and false 
positives generated by the search string. We then randomly selected and 
created the fifty “clear win” cases.  
                                                                                                                     
 116. See SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST., STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACTS, AN EMPIRICAL 
INVESTIGATION OF PRIVATE LITIGATION (2009) (describing the database), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1708175. 
 117. The search string used for the term “damage awards” was “damage! w/s award!”. 
17
Butler and Wright: Are State Consumer Protection Acts Really Little-FTC Acts?
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
180 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
 
 The third sample consisted of FTC cases which provide a control 
group. Eight decisions were randomly selected, each representing a case 
the FTC brought in court containing sufficient case facts.118 Two cases, 
which the FTC investigated but ultimately dismissed the complaints, were 
separately chosen and added to the second sample.119 The third sample 
involves “clear wins” for CPA claimants at the state trial court level on the 
CPA claim in which the result was either unchallenged or upheld on 
appeal. 
C.  Case Summaries and Questionnaires  
After selecting the three samples of cases, we developed one-page 
summaries of the cases and a questionnaire for completion by the Shadow 
Commissioners. Party names and identifying case characteristics were 
removed so that Shadow Commissioners could not directly identify the 
cases. Before distributing the questionnaires to the Shadow 
Commissioners, an additional expert in FTC consumer protection actions 
who was not a member of the Shadow FTC reviewed the questions and 
case scenarios. Based on the reviewer’s feedback, adjustments were made 
to the questions and scenarios to ensure that the Shadow Commissioners 
could complete the review of all sixty scenarios–from each of the three 
samples–in three hours or less. After testing the questionnaire, the 
questions in Figure 1 were used for each scenario.120 
The survey process took place in two rounds during which the Shadow 
Commissioners reviewed 110 one-page case scenarios. After reading the 
scenarios, each Shadow Commissioner determined whether he or she 
believed the practice was unfair or deceptive according to FTC standards 
and whether he or she believed the FTC would initiate an enforcement 
action. The Shadow Commissioners were asked to base their answers only 
on the information presented in the scenario, their understanding of current 
federal consumer protection law, their expertise, and the assumptions that 
(1) the FTC has jurisdiction over the entity or entities and (2) the practice 
is in or affects interstate or foreign commerce.  
                                                                                                                     
 118. The set of FTC cases from which we drew the eight was a set of FTC cases captured by 
the original over-inclusive search string used to identify cases for the population database. These 
cases had been removed from the final population database because they did not include CPA 
claims brought by either party in the suit at issue. 
 119. These two cases were not included in the population database nor randomly chosen as we 
had only limited available information on FTC investigations where the Commission ultimately 
withdrew the complaint. 
 120. To limit potential ordering effects, we changed the order of the scenarios three times with 
different versions issued randomly to the Shadow Commissioners. We randomized the order by 
drawing the sixty numbers three separate times. After the Shadow Commissioners completed the 
questionnaires, we collected the responses and informed the Shadow Commissioners of the origin 
of the scenarios. We then coded the results of the questionnaire, identifying the Shadow 
Commissioners only by a study code number. 
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Shadow Commissioners were not told prior to completing each round 
that the case scenarios were derived from litigated consumer protection 
cases. Further, the Shadow Commissioners did not know the identities of 
the other Shadow Commissioners, did not collaborate in answering the 
questions, and could not consult any outside sources. The Shadow 
Commissioners were not allowed to return to previous scenarios once they 
had answered a question. Shadow Commissioners were compensated for 
their participation. For an example of scenarios, see Appendices A and B. 
Round 1 included the fifty cases from the random sample and the ten 
cases from the FTC control sample. The random sample allows inferences 
to be drawn concerning the nature of CPA claims distributed throughout 
the civil justice system.  
Round 2 focused on the “clear wins” discussed above and examined 
how a sample of successful CPA claims would fare under the FTC 
standard. Each decision in the population database of reported CPA 
decisions represents a unique case and was not previously presented to the 
Shadow Commissioners in Round 1. The Shadow Commissioners 
answered the same questions in three hours or less under the same 
parameters as Round 1, with the exception that during Round 2 the 
Shadow Commissioners were aware that the case scenarios were derived 
from litigated consumer protection cases. The Shadow Commissioners did 
not know the cases all represented CPA claimant wins.121 
The Shadow FTC review of litigated cases provides the opportunity to 
evaluate the distribution of CPA claims currently moving through the civil 
justice system. While we do not observe all litigated cases, this study 
presents an important first step in collecting and analyzing data relevant to 
resolving important policy debates surrounding CPAs and civil justice 
reform more generally. Questions 1a and 2a in Figure 1 focus on whether 
the Shadow Commissioner believes the available excerpted facts constitute 
illegal conduct under the FTC Policy Statements for deception or 
unfairness.122 Question 3a goes a step further to ask Shadow 
Commissioners whether, relying on their expertise and experience with 
FTC consumer protection enforcement, they believe the FTC would initiate 
an enforcement action in the particular case. 
                                                                                                                     
 121. To limit ordering effects, we changed the order of the scenarios three times with different 
versions issued randomly to the Shadow Commissioners. We randomized the order by drawing the 
fifty numbers three separate times. We then coded the results with the Shadow Commissioners 
identified only by a new study code number. 
 122. Letter from James C. Miller III to John D. Dingell, supra note 84; Letter from Michael 
Pertschuk, Paul Rand, David A. Clanton, Robert Pitofsky, and Patricia P. Bailey to Wendell H. 
Ford and John C. Danforth, supra note 84. 
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FIGURE 1 
 
Q1a. Based on the case facts, do you believe the alleged practice is legally  
deceptive under the FTC’s deception policy statement? □ Yes □ No 
 
Q1b. If no, please identify the legal prerequisite or prerequisites for deception  
that are not satisfied. 
 □ A misrepresentation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead the 
consumer 
 □ The consumer’s interpretation or reaction to the misrepresentation, 
omission or practice is reasonable under the circumstances 
 □ The representation, omission or practice must be material 
 
Q2a. Based on the case facts, do you believe the alleged practice is legally  
unfair under the FTC’s unfairness policy statement? □ Yes □ No 
 
Q2b. If no, please identify the legal prerequisite or prerequisites for  
unfairness that are not satisfied. 
 □ Cause substantial injury 
 □ Consumer injury not outweighed by offsetting consumer or competitive  
benefits 
 □ Injury could not have been reasonably avoided 
 
Q3a. Based on the facts presented above, do you believe the FTC would initiate a  
consumer protection enforcement action?  □ Yes □ No 
 
Q3b. Briefly explain: 
___________________________________________________________________ 
III.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
We first consider the Shadow Commission’s view of the illegality of 
state CPA claims under the FTC standard. We then consider whether, if the 
Shadow Commission considered an activity to be illegal, the Shadow 
Commission would pursue an enforcement action against the illegal 
activity. Finally, we test the quality of the Shadow FTC’s decision making 
against decisions by the actual FTC. 
Since the goal of the Shadow FTC was to simulate the hypothetical 
actions of the FTC, only aggregate results appear below rather than 
individual Shadow Commissioner votes. The results focus on the answers 
given by the majority (three or more) of the Shadow Commissioners. 
Unanimous votes were common, making up between 24% and 62% of 
responses depending on question and round.  
Votes in which more than one commissioner disagreed with the 
majority were rare. Three-to-two split votes in which three commissioners 
voted one way and two the other were few. The large majority of votes 
were either 5-0 or 4-1. In Round 1, out of the fifty non-FTC cases, the 
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Shadow Commissioners were split thirty times in seventeen case scenarios: 
eight times over deceptive conduct, thirteen times over unfair conduct, and 
nine times over the likelihood of enforcement. Similarly in the Round 2 
scenarios, out of fifty non-FTC cases, the Shadow Commissioners were 
split thirty times in nineteen case scenarios: sixteen times over deceptive 
conduct, nine times over unfair conduct, and five times over the likelihood 
of enforcement. We then examined instances of split voting to identify a 
possible bias by political affiliation. It is unlikely that political affiliation 
drove split decisions. Of the thirty votes that were split, only seventeen 
split in such a way that both Republicans voted in one way, and both 
Democrats voted the other. 
A.  Illegality  
A critical empirical challenge in the CPA policy debate is to identify 
the quality of CPA claims currently working through the civil justice 
system. For Round 1, the Shadow Commission found that most cases did 
not meet FTC illegality standards. A majority of Shadow Commissioners 
believed that the alleged practice was illegal, either deceptive or unfair 
under the relevant FTC Policy Statement, in only eleven out of fifty (22%) 
case scenarios.  
This result suggests at the very least that the CPA claims litigated in 
state and federal courts differ from those involving illegal conduct under 
the FTC standard. In other words, a substantial majority of CPA litigation 
involves claims consistent with behavior that is likely legal under the FTC 
standard. This result is consistent with the concern that CPAs apply more 
lenient and plaintiff friendly standards, which lower the quality of a claim 
required to justify filing on an expected value basis. 
Nonetheless, our Round 1 results should be interpreted with caution. 
Other possible explanations exist for the Shadow FTC’s determination that 
the CPA claims in our random sample of case scenarios do not violate 
federal consumer protection law under FTC standards. One possible 
explanation is that the cases’ fact descriptions forming the basis of the 
excerpts given to Shadow Commissioners may not have included all of the 
facts ultimately relevant to the determination of liability. A second reason 
could be that in Round 1, while the Shadow Commission found that three 
cases presented illegal actions that the FTC would likely enforce, only two 
cases had a clear CPA claimant win at trial.123 
In Round 2, the sample of case scenarios involve “clear wins” for CPA 
claimants at the state trial court level on the CPA claim where the result 
was either unchallenged or upheld on appeal. Again, this is a sample biased 
intentionally toward the most successful CPA claims. Our key finding from 
Round 2 is that the Shadow Commission believed that there was either 
                                                                                                                     
 123. The two cases do not include the ongoing cases of Round 1, and they make up only 4.5% 
of the forty-four closed cases. 
21
Butler and Wright: Are State Consumer Protection Acts Really Little-FTC Acts?
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
184 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
 
unfair or deceptive conduct under the FTC standards in thirty-one cases (or 
62% of the time). Although all Shadow Commissioners answered the 
questions on illegal acts for every scenario, in seven cases the Shadow 
Commission had tied answers to the question on enforcement due to non-
responses. Removing those cases, a majority of Shadow Commissioners 
believed that there was an unfair or deceptive act pursuant to the FTC 
standards in twenty-four out of forty-three cases (55.8%). 
The Round 1 and 2 questionnaires were constructed in the same manner 
and taken by the same set of Shadow Commissioners at different times. 
The differences between the Shadow Commission determinations in 
Round 1 and Round 2, when evaluating a random sample of CPA cases 
and clear CPA wins respectively, are striking.124 Not surprisingly, the 
Shadow FTC was more likely to believe that the scenarios for clear CPA 
wins (Round 2) involved illegal conduct than the general CPA cases 
(Round 1) as can be seen in Table 1. The difference is significant at the 1% 
level.125 
 
TABLE 1 
 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 2* FTC Controls 
Total Cases 50 50 43 10 
Possible Illegal Conduct 11 31 24 10 
 % of Total 22.0% 62.0% 55.8% 100.0% 
Possible FTC Enforcement 6 10 10 10 
 % of Total 12.0% 20.0% 23.3% 100.0% 
 % of Possible Illegal Conduct 54.5% 32.3% 41.7% 100.0% 
* Excludes cases where the enforcement question resulted in a tie vote. 
 
Not surprisingly, for successful CPA claims in Round 2, the Shadow 
FTC was more likely to find possible illegal conduct than in the 
representative sample of cases from Round 1. However, even for Round 
2’s successful CPA claims, the Shadow FTC only found possible illegal 
conduct in just over one-half of the cases.126  
                                                                                                                     
 124. Note that the underlying population of cases in Round 2 is a complete subset of the 
underlying population of cases in Round 1. As such, there is some overlap that the z-statistics in 
this section do not take into account. However, given the positive relationship between CPA cases 
that survive to trial and the likelihood that the Shadow Commission believes the conduct was illegal 
under the FTC standards and/or that the FTC would initiate an enforcement action, it is likely that 
this overlap functionally understates the true difference between clear CPA wins and all other CPA 
cases. 
 125. A two-group test of proportions allows us to reject the null hypothesis that the proportion 
of cases where the majority of Shadow Commissioners believed the scenario contained some illegal 
conduct under the FTC standards is the same between the two rounds at the 1% level (z = -4.052, p 
= 0.000). We get similar results for the non-parametric Spearman rank correlation. 
 126.  One possible concern is that the composition of cases across the rounds differed on some 
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It is striking that nineteen of the fifty clear win cases involved activity 
that the Shadow FTC would not consider illegal under the FTC standard. 
These Type 1 errors—finding innocent parties guilty of wrongdoing—
could represent an important problem with CPAs. More specifically, under 
the plausible assumption that the FTC standard with its public interest 
requirement is less likely to condemn efficient and pro-competitive 
business conduct than the CPA standards, the Round 2 results suggest that 
CPA liability may condemn efficient, pro-competitive conduct. Further, 
liability for efficient business conduct under CPAs could further harm 
consumers through deterring efficient conduct more broadly. These Type 1 
errors (“false positives”) in the consumer protection context are likely 
greater than the social costs associated with Type 2 errors (“false 
negatives”) because the market provides a self-correcting mechanism for 
the latter.127 While direct empirical evidence on the social costs of errors is 
difficult to obtain, these results raise significant concerns about whether 
the unintended consequences of CPA liability outweigh its consumer 
protection value, and there is evidence from other settings that liability 
prone to significant Type 1 errors can lead to significant consumer 
losses.128 
B.  Enforcement 
In both rounds, the Shadow Commission supported enforcement in less 
than a quarter of the total scenarios. Of the eleven cases containing illegal 
conduct in Round 1, only six would result in FTC enforcement. In Round 
                                                                                                                     
dimension other than the disposition of the claim. For example, Round 2 cases did not include 
federal district court cases, whereas Round 1 included both federal and state court decisions.  
However, if only the state appellate court cases in both rounds are analyzed, there is still a 
statistically significant difference at the 5% level. A two-group test of proportions allows us to 
reject the null hypothesis that the proportion of cases where the majority of Shadow Commissioners 
believed the scenario contained some illegal conduct under the FTC standards is the same between 
the two rounds at the 5% level (z = -2.536, p = 0.011). We get similar results for the non-parametric 
Spearman rank correlation. 
 127. For a similar analysis of asymmetrical error costs in the related antitrust context, see 
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984). 
 128. Even though the average price effect of liability costs may be small across industries, in 
some sectors it can be quite large. See Tomas J. Philipson & Eric Sun, Is the Food and Drug 
Administration Safe and Effective?, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 85, 94–95 (2008) (suggesting that the 
deadweight losses to consumers and producers from the price increase due to product liability 
litigation in the pharmaceutical industry is in the tens of billions of dollars); Paul Rubin & Joanna 
Shepherd, Tort Reform and Accidental Deaths, 50 J.L. & ECON. 221 (2007) (estimating that product 
liability has increased accidental deaths by raising the prices of safety-enhancing goods and 
services); Richard L. Manning, Changing Rules in Tort Law and the Market for Childhood 
Vaccines, 37 J.L. & ECON. 247, 273 (1994) (suggesting that the price of vaccines went up 
twentyfold after product liability imposed). For a discussion of these costs in the consumer 
protection context related to financial services, see David S. Evans & Joshua D. Wright, The Effect 
of the Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009 on Consumer Credit, 22 LOY. 
CONSUMER L. REV. 277 (2010). 
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2, there were thirty-one cases of possible illegal activity, but only ten cases 
would trigger FTC enforcement. Although the Shadow Commission found 
possible illegal conduct in thirty-one Round 2 cases, the Shadow 
Commission would recommend enforcement in only ten of those cases. 
When we dropped the seven cases with the tied results from the 
Shadow FTC from Round 2 but included all non-FTC cases from Round 1, 
the Shadow FTC believed that the FTC would initiate an enforcement 
action in six of the fifty general CPA cases (or 12%) and in ten of the forty-
three clear CPA wins (or 23.3%), which can be seen in Table 1. This 
difference is statistically significant only at slightly above the 15% level.129 
Thus, focusing exclusively on the clear CPA wins, the Shadow 
Commission identified deceptive or unfair conduct under the FTC 
standards in over half of the cases. Even in these cases, however, the 
Shadow Commission believed that the FTC would only bring enforcement 
actions less than a quarter of the time. While for every scenario in which 
the Shadow Commission believed the FTC would initiate an enforcement 
action the Shadow Commission also believed that either deceptive or 
unfair conduct occurred, the reverse is not true. Of the twenty-four cases 
where the Shadow Commission thought the scenario indicated some illegal 
conduct under the FTC standard, in ten of these cases the Shadow 
Commission also thought that the FTC would initiate an enforcement 
action. Specifically, the difference in proportions between scenarios 
believed to have illegal conduct and those believed would be enforced by 
the FTC based on the available case facts is significant at the 1% level.130 
These findings could suggest that clear CPA wins may have been 
brought under similar standards to the FTC’s but are less likely to be the 
type of case enforced by the FTC. As such, there is some support for the 
theory that CPAs allow private litigants to bring smaller scale cases that 
approximate FTC enforcement actions but might not warrant allocation of 
FTC resources. 
C.  Control Results—FTC Cases 
As discussed, ten FTC cases were included in Round 1 but were not 
otherwise designated as FTC cases in any way. The FTC litigated eight of 
these cases and issued complaints for the remaining two that it ultimately 
dismissed. The Shadow Commission agreed in each of the ten cases that 
                                                                                                                     
 129. A two-group test of proportions only allows us to reject the null hypothesis that the 
proportion of cases where the majority of Shadow Commissioners believed the FTC would initiate 
an enforcement action based on the available case facts between the two rounds at above the 15% 
level (z = -1.434, p = 0.152). We get similar results for the non-parametric Spearman rank 
correlation. 
 130. For the forty-three cases that did not have a tied Shadow Commission, a two-sample test 
of proportions allowed us to reject the null hypothesis that the proportions of cases in which the 
majority of Shadow Commissioners believe there was illegal conduct and in which the majority of 
Shadow Commissioners believed the FTC would initiate an enforcement action were equal at the 
1% level (z = 3.088, p = 0.002). 
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the scenario described unfair or deceptive conduct. This result suggests that 
the Shadow FTC was able to reach the same conclusion as the FTC in 
practice. In contrast to these FTC control cases, the Shadow Commission 
believed there was possible illegal conduct in only 15.9% or 22% of the 
general CPA cases depending on whether ongoing cases are included. The 
differences are statistically significant regardless of whether we count 
ongoing cases.131 Likewise, in all ten of the FTC cases, a majority of 
Shadow Commissioners thought the FTC might initiate an enforcement 
action in contrast to the 6.8% or 12% of Round 1 general CPA cases the 
Shadow Commissioners agreed might have been enforced (depending on 
whether the ongoing cases are dropped). Again, these differences are 
statistically significant.132 
The Shadow Commission identified similar characteristics in the FTC 
and state court scenarios and reached accurate conclusions regarding FTC 
action. This gives credence to the Shadow Commission's findings in non-
FTC case scenarios. Further, the results may suggest that while the clear 
CPA wins are more similar to FTC cases than general CPA claims, even 
winning CPA cases are at least somewhat unlike FTC cases. In other 
words, the clear CPA wins may have a higher probability of involving 
illegal conduct under the FTC standards in the majority of instances but 
may not necessarily be cases the FTC is likely to enforce.  
IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
This Article set out to study whether state Little-FTC Acts do, in fact, 
pursue the same mission as the FTC. This Article has produced a number 
of findings that will inform policy debates on CPAs. The Shadow 
Commission study demonstrates that there are qualitative differences 
between CPA decisions and actions that would likely be found illegal and 
enforced under relevant FTC standards. Most CPA claims would not 
constitute illegal conduct under FTC consumer protection standards. The 
Shadow FTC found that 78% of a sample of CPA claims would not 
constitute legally unfair or deceptive conduct under FTC policy statements. 
While relatively few CPA claims would constitute illegal conduct under 
the FTC standard (22%), even fewer (12%) would result in FTC 
enforcement action. Almost 40% of CPA claims where the consumer 
plaintiff prevailed at trial would not constitute illegal conduct under FTC 
                                                                                                                     
 131. A two-group test of proportions allows us to reject the null hypothesis that the proportion 
of cases in which the majority of Shadow Commissioners believed the scenarios contained some 
illegal conduct is the same between FTC cases and general CPA cases in Round 1 at the 1% level (z 
= -4.721, p = 0.000 for all cases and z = -5.168, p = 0.000 for completed cases only). We get similar 
results for the non-parametric Spearman rank correlation. 
 132. A two-group test of proportions allows us to reject the null hypothesis that the proportion 
of cases in which the majority of Shadow Commissioners believed the FTC would initiate an 
enforcement action based on available case facts is the same between FTC cases and general CPA 
cases in Round 1 at the 1% level (z = -5.745, p = 0.000 for all cases and z = -6.221, p = 0.000 for 
completed cases only). We get similar results for the non-parametric Spearman rank correlation. 
25
Butler and Wright: Are State Consumer Protection Acts Really Little-FTC Acts?
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
188 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
 
standards. In a sample of CPA claims in which the consumer plaintiff 
prevailed in court, the Shadow FTC found that 38% of these successful 
claims would not constitute illegal conduct under the FTC standard. 
Although most of these successful cases would meet the FTC illegality 
standards, the Shadow survey results suggest that only 23% would likely 
be enforced by the FTC. 
These findings have important implications for those interested in 
discussing and formulating public policy regarding CPAs: 
1. To the extent that CPAs are envisioned as complements to 
FTC consumer protection, they appear to overshoot the 
mark. While resource limitations prevent the FTC from 
pursuing enforcement in every case of unfair or deceptive 
conduct, this Article suggests that CPAs go well beyond filling 
this gap. Instead, CPAs may allow consumers to pursue 
different types of claims, including many that do not involve 
conduct that would be illegal under FTC standards for 
consumer protection. 
 
2. To the extent that the FTC standard meets its goal of an 
optimal balance between the public interest and protection 
of individual consumers, it is uncertain that the broader 
coverage of CPAs benefits consumers. The FTC standard 
seeks to limit consumer protection enforcement to those actions 
that will serve the public interest generally. CPAs that reach 
beyond this optimal enforcement goal may deter businesses 
from legitimate activity and force them to focus on legal matters 
unrelated to their business goals. Additionally, any increases in 
consumer protection that are provided by CPAs must be 
considered against the burdens that they impose on the civil 
justice system. 
The results presented in this Article may inform policy discussions on 
CPAs, but the analysis has limitations. The case fact descriptions forming 
the basis of the excerpts given to Shadow Commissioners may not have 
included all of the facts ultimately relevant to the determination of liability. 
Nevertheless, the results clearly suggest that private litigation under Little-
FTC Acts tends to pursue a different consumer protection mission than the 
Bureau of Consumer Protection at the Federal Trade Commission. 
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APPENDIX A: SHADOW FTC SCENARIO EXAMPLE—
ROUND 1 
 
Scenario 1: 
Real Estate Agent (REA) buys and resells houses for a profit, and he became interested in 
purchasing a house being offered for sale by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD). REA personally inspected the house and decided to make an offer to 
purchase it. His initial offer was rejected by HUD in favor of another offer but was placed as a 
back-up in the event the contract for sale with the winning bidder did not close. The winning bidder 
hired a licensed inspector to examine the house and found evidence of active termites inside the 
home, including noticeable holes in the bathroom ceiling and active termites in the baseboards. The 
winning bidder terminated the contract, and HUD then asked REA if he was still interested in 
purchasing the property. REA personally examined the house again and purchased it stating he did 
not see any evidence of termites in the house before he bought it. Shortly after purchasing the 
property, REA hired several contractors to make repairs and improvements, intending to place the 
house back on the market for sale once the repairs were completed.  
 
Contractor had done remodeling work for REA in the past on a number of different houses, and 
was hired to perform general repair work including repainting the interior and exterior walls. 
During the course of making repairs, Contractor noticed evidence of active termites. Contractor may 
have informed REA about the termites and may have been told to continue his work making 
cosmetic repairs. Contractor has also apparently covered over termite damage in other homes for 
REA. Contractor went ahead with the repairs as asked by REA. 
 
Buyers became aware of the house being sold by REA through their real estate agent. Buyers 
toured the house with his agent and it had been newly painted and carpeted. Buyers made an offer 
to purchase the house and, following a series of negotiations, signed an earnest money contract. 
On the same day he entered into the earnest money contract, Buyers received a “Seller’s 
Disclosure of Property Condition” form signed by REA. REA indicated on the form that he had 
no knowledge of any active termites, termite damage, or previous termite treatment. Buyers hired 
an inspector to examine the house, and an inspection was performed one month later. This 
inspection uncovered active termites on the house’s exterior, as well as evidence of previous 
termite treatment along the front porch. REA paid to have a “spot” treatment done for the termites 
on the exterior. The sale of the house to Buyers closed in the following month. 
 
A few months later, Buyers discovered a swarm of termites inside their home. They telephoned 
REA who referred them to the pest control company that performed the spot treatment before 
closing. The company returned to the home and performed another spot treatment. This appeared to 
resolve the problem until the following year when termites again swarmed inside the house. This 
time Buyers paid for a full treatment by a different pest control company. Buyers also hired a 
general contractor to examine the house and estimate the cost of repairing the damage caused by the 
termites. 
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Q1a. Based on the case facts, do you believe the alleged practice is legally deceptive under the 
FTC’s deception policy statement? □ Yes □ No 
 
Q1b. If no, please identify the legal prerequisite or prerequisites for deception that are not 
satisfied. 
 □ A misrepresentation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer 
 □ The consumer’s interpretation or reaction to the misrepresentation, omission or practice 
  is reasonable under the circumstances 
 □ The representation, omission or practice must be material 
  
Q2a. Based on the case facts, do you believe the alleged practice is legally unfair under the 
FTC’s unfairness policy statement? □ Yes □ No 
 
Q2b. If no, please identify the legal prerequisite or prerequisites for unfairness that are not 
satisfied. 
 □ Cause substantial injury 
 □ Consumer injury not outweighed by offsetting consumer or competitive benefits 
 □ Injury could not have been reasonably avoided 
 
Q3a. Based on the facts presented above, do you believe the FTC would initiate a consumer 
protection enforcement action? □ Yes □ No 
 
 Q3b. Briefly explain________________________________________________________ 
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APPENDIX B: SHADOW FTC SCENARIO EXAMPLE— 
ROUND 2 
 
Scenario 1: 
 
David D. is a developmentally disabled young man who has been under the legal guardianship 
of his parents since he turned eighteen. At the age of twenty-one, David D. was living in his own 
apartment, but his parents strictly controlled his finances. They spoke with David D. nearly every 
day. 
 
David D. wanted to buy a car but neither of his parents would allow him to do so. They 
assumed their word would be final because they did not realize that David D. could obtain any 
appreciable amount of money with his debit card. David D. went to Car Dealership, used his debit 
card to buy a new car, and received credit for a trade-in on his old car. 
 
Days after David D. bought the car, his mother came to Car Dealership and explained that 
David D. was under the legal guardianship of his parents and had no legal authority to enter into a 
contract to buy the car. She showed Car Dealership David D.’s guardianship papers and asked to 
return the car. Car Dealership would not take back the car saying that the company sold cars to “a 
lot of people who aren’t very smart” and that the contract was valid. David D.’s mother insisted that 
the contract was void, but Car Dealership handed the keys to David D. who drove off in the new 
car. 
 
A few days later, David D. damaged the car in a one-car accident. His parents then managed to 
get the car away from David D. and return it to Car Dealership. However, when David D. called 
Car Dealership to ask for his trade-in back, someone at Car Dealership told him that he could not 
have it but could pick up his new car any time. David D. got a ride to Car Dealership and picked 
up the new car. The next day his parents were able to convince David D. to return the car to Car 
Dealership yet again, and this time he left the car there. 
 
Several people called Car Dealership on behalf of David D.’s parents including the 
investigator for David D.’s guardianship case. Car Dealership was advised that the guardianship 
did indeed make the contract legally void but it apparently did not listen to that advice. Car 
Dealership did not seek legal advice on the validity of the contract until a month after the sale. 
Car Dealership assigned David D.’s loan to a collection agency but never informed it of 
David D.’s incapacity. It also demanded storage fees from David D. for keeping the new car on 
its lot. It sold David D.’s trade-in on the same day the new car was brought back for the second 
time, even though the sale was still being contested. 
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Q1a. Based on the case facts, do you believe the alleged practice is legally deceptive under the 
FTC’s deception policy statement?  □ Yes □ No 
 
Q1b. If no, please identify the legal prerequisite or prerequisites for deception that are not 
satisfied. 
 □ A misrepresentation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer 
 □ The consumer's interpretation or reaction to the misrepresentation, omission or practice 
  is reasonable under the circumstances 
 □ The representation, omission or practice must be material 
  
Q2a. Based on the case facts, do you believe the alleged practice is legally unfair under the 
FTC’s unfairness policy statement? □ Yes □ No 
 
Q2b. If no, please identify the legal prerequisite or prerequisites for unfairness that are not 
satisfied. 
 □ Cause substantial injury 
 □ Consumer injury not outweighed by offsetting consumer or competitive benefits 
 □ Injury could not have been reasonably avoided 
 
Q3a. Based on the facts presented above, do you believe the FTC would initiate a consumer 
protection enforcement action? □ Yes □ No 
 
Q3b. Briefly explain_______________________________________________________ 
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